Strategy, Planning, Control

Welcome to our first 'Incidents Online' page. We are working to bring you a new improved format. In the meantime, please send us (contact@riskedge.com.au) any water quality events, operational issues or incidents that you know of and we will upload them to the database with an acknowledgement of the source.

To search the table, click in the header box you are interested in, or simply use the search bar to the right, and type in the year, or first letters of a hazard/contaminant e.g. cryp for Cryptosporidium, camp for Campylobacter and the entries for those items will appear.

 

 

YearAreaLocationContaminant / IssueEventImpactReference
2016Drinking waterNot statedVariousVerizon reported that 'Kemuri Water Company' had experienced data breaches of its SCADA system through hacking. The Operational Technology (OT) end of the water district relied on antiquated computer systems running operating systems from ten plus years ago. Further, only a single employee was capable of administering the system. The system ran the water district’s valve and flow control application that was responsible for manipulating hundreds of Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs), housed customer Personally Identifiable Information (PII) and associated billing information, as well as KWC’s financials. Illegal cyber activities resulted in manipulating the PLCs that managed ducts and valves. No clear motive for the attack was found however the low level of damage incurred was more due to the fact that the hacktivists did not have specific knowledge of the SCADA system.
"Having internet facing servers, especially web servers, directly connected to SCADA management systems is far from a best practice. Many issues like outdated systems and missing patches contributed to the data breach—the lack of isolation
of critical assets, weak authentication mechanisms and unsafe practices of protecting passwords also enabled the threat actors to gain far more access than should have been possible. KWC’s alert functionality played a key role in detecting the changed amounts of chemicals and the flow rates. Implementation of a layered defense-in-depth strategy could have detected the attack earlier, limiting its
success or preventing it altogether."
Information provided by Nahim Nehme, Griffith Council.
Moderator Note: See opinion piece on the benefits of risk management and compliance at CERM Academy (http://tinyurl.com/hw6wfng)
Issues were caused with unauthorised dosage of water treatment chemicals, the water flow rate, and disruptions with water distribution and access to over 2.5 million customer recordsVerizon Link
2016Drinking waterFlint, Michigan, USALeadFlint, under a state-appointed emergency manager, switched to Flint River water in April 2014 from the Lake Huron supply that Detroit uses to save money. Complaints about the water began within a month of the move. But Flint did not return to Detroit water until October 2015 after tests showed elevated levels of lead. Corrosive water from the river, caused more lead to leach from Flint pipes than Detroit water did.
Moderator Note: See opinion piece on water supply governance at CERM Academy (http://tinyurl.com/zw2ovy9)
As many as 9,000 children have been affected by adverse lead levelsSBS Link
2015Raw waterGrafton, NSW, AustraliaChlorineRepairs were being undertaken on pipework for a chlorination system located in a shed at the chlorination plant. Chlorine is fed by suction as water flows from a booster pump. The isolation valve sometimes does not open immediately, but the worker undertaking the repairs was not aware of this (other workers who were aware of the issue have been waiting until they hear and see the valve open). The isolation valve did not open and when the booster pump was turned back on, the pressure from the closed valve resulted in failure of the pipework. The chlorine injector point is only 300 mm from the section of pipe which failed, and there was insufficient dilution to prevent release of chlorine gas into the shed. Previous risk assessments had considered it impossible for there to be a chlorine gas leak at this location due to the dilution of chlorine with water. The isolation points for the chlorine are approximately 150 metres from the shed so it took several minutes to shut the chlorine off. Due to the chlorine not being previously considered as a risk, a rescue plan was not in place and Breathing Apparatus was only located at the isolation point. Actions taken as a result of this incident include:
* Procedure for turning the pump on and off and isolating the valves were mounted on the control panel.
* Isolation valves on chlorine gas feed lines were installed outside the shed
* A Chlorine sensor was installed within the shed with an external visual alarm
* Workers were reminded at a Toolbox talk that machinery faults are to be advised immediately to
supervisors, and the faulty machinery tagged out.

This was a Workcover notifiable incident.
Operator off work for 1 day (precautionary)Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2015WaterGrafton, NSW, AustraliaChlorineRepairs were being undertaken on pipework for a chlorination system located in a shed at the chlorination plant. Chlorine is fed by suction as water flows from a booster pump. The isolation valve sometimes does not open immediately, but the worker undertaking the repairs was not aware of this (other workers who were aware of the issue were waiting until they heard and saw the valve open). The isolation valve did not open and when the booster pump was turned back on, the pressure from the closed valve reuslted in failure of the pipework. The chlorine injector point is only 300mm from the section of pipe which failed, and there was insufficient dilution to prevent release of chlorine gas into the shed. Previous risk assessments had considered it impossible for there to be a chlorine gas leak at this location due to the dilution of chlorine with water. The isolation points for the chlorine are approximately 150 metres from the shed so it took several minutes to shut the chlorine off. Due to the chlorine not being previously considered as a risk, a rescue plan was not in place and Breathing Apparatus was only located at the isolation point. Actions taken as a result of this incident include:
* Procedure for turning the pump on and off and isolating the valves were mounted on the control panel.
* isolation valves on chlorine gas feed lines were installed outside the shed
* A Chlorine sensor was installed within the shed with an external visual alarm
* Workers were reminded at a toolbox talk that machinery faults are to be advised immediately to
supervisors, and the faulty machinery tagged out.

This was a Workcover notifiable incident.
Operator off work for 1 day (precautionary)Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2014Drinking waterLower Clarence area, NSW, AustraliaDirty WaterThe area impacted by this incident is the area supplied with drinking water from the 21ML terminal reservoir at Maclean, NSW. This area included the towns of Maclean itself, Yamba, Iluka, Brooms Head, Gulmarrad, Ashby, Harwood, Palmers Island, Woombah, Angourie and Wooloweyah. The population of this area is estimated to be approximately 20,000 people. As Council's supply is unfiltered, until about 2004 river extraction occurred regardless of raw water quality and there was very low or no chlorine reticulation in the area serviced by the terminal reservoir, the reticulation serviced by the reservoir had significant biofilm growth. Following commissioning of a permanent supplementary chlorine dosing point at the reservoir in late 2013, in the week before Christmas 2013 the Public Health Unit requested Council to significantly increase the chlorine dose and strongly implied that they would require Council to issue a boil water alert if it didn't increase the dosing rate. Council raised concerns that the sudden increase in chlorine residual would result in rapid biofilm die-off and subsequent dirty water events, but the PHU contended this was preferable to a potential E. coli event. For the first three months of 2014 Council received abnormally high numbers of dirty water complaints due to biofilm die-off, with up to 20 customer reports of dirty water a day compared with a "normal" rate of 1 to 2 reports. Council's proposed approach to supplementary chlorination, which was circumvented by the PHU implying they would require a boil water alert if the dosing rate was not significantly increased, was to gradually increase the dosing rate so that biofilm dieoff in the reticulation (and hence dirty water events) were minimised. It is considered the high incidence of dirty water reports significantly damaged customer's confidence in the quality of water supplied.
Moderator's Note: Readers are reminded of the first principle of the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines: "The greatest risks to consumers of drinking water are pathogenic microorganisms.
Protection of water sources and treatment are of paramount importance and must
never be compromised."
20,000 customers having frequenty dirty water events for 3 monthsGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2013Drinking waterMinnie Waters, NSW, AustraliaE. coli found leading to a Boil Water AlertMinnie Waters is a coastal village of around 250 people located approximately 50km east of Grafton. Following E. coli detections during routine sampling, Minnie Water residents were advised to boil water from 8th February 2013 until 12th February 2013, and then again from the 6th March 2013 until the 13th March 2013. In response to both E. coli detections Council added liquid chlorine to the reservoir, flushed the system, and inspected the reservoir. The first detection was thought to be related to extraction from Lake Minnie Water (the raw water supply) during a high rainfall event, introducing a high organic load to the system. Since that event, the Minnie Water scheme has selective extraction, where operators cease extraction during extreme wet weather events. For the second event, there was no obvious contamination source. The top section of the reservoir is mesh and it is thought that during a significant East Coast Low event with both heavy rainfall and gale force winds, contaminated stormwater runoff from the roof was blown back into the reservoir through the mesh.250 customers on boil water alert for 4 daysGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2013Drinking waterAshby, NSW, AustraliaE. coli found leading to a Boil Water AlertDuring a flood event in January 2013 a mains break on a dead end line occurred in an area under floodwater. The break was subsequently determined to be due to a thrust block moving. The dead end line was isolated by closing a stop valve until repairs to the main could be made when access was available after the flood. Due to the possible ingress of flood water to the main, a precautionary boil water advice was issued to residents serviced by the line when the stop valve was opened. Despite flushing of the line and chlorine dosing at the repair site, E. coli was detected for three tests following repair of the line which indicates that flood water had entered the main. 20 customers on a boil water alert for 4 daysGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2013Drinking waterLower Clarence area, NSW, AustraliaE. coli found leading to a Boil Water AlertThe area impacted by this incident is the area supplied with drinking water from the 21ML terminal reservoir at Maclean, NSW. This area included the towns of Maclean itself, Yamba, Iluka, Brooms Head, Gulmarrad, Ashby, Harwood, Palmers Island, Woombah, Angourie and Wooloweyah. The population of this area is estimated to be approximately 20,000 people. Due to the distance from the chloramination point these towns historically had very low chlorine residuals. Following E. coli detection at more than one location during routine sampling, residents in these areas were advised to boil water from 16th May 2013 until 21st May 2013. Council's immediate response included adding chlorine to various reservoirs, flushing the network, and visual inspections of reservoirs. Council also established a temporary chlorine dosing point at 21ML reservoir. Numerous reservoirs were emptied and cleaned out, although no obvious contamination source was located. It is thought that the E. coli detections may have been related to the use of an old bypass lines at the reservoir site, which was not flushed prior to use, and may have had aged water within. There is now a permanent supplementary chlorine dosing point at the terminal reservoir.20,000 customers on a boil water alert for 5 daysGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2013WaterShannondale, NSW, AustraliaN/ASelective offtake at different depths in a dam is achieved with the use of removable baulks. The baulks are raised and lowered into position using a crane, and there is a mechanism which unlatches the crane hook from the baulk when it encounters sufficent force (i.e. when it is stopped by the baulk underneath). The baulks are lowered through a slot in the dam offtake tower. The operator was changing baulks when the baulk being lowered missed the slot and hit the deck of the offtake tower with sufficient force to unlatch the hook. The baulk then fell sideways. Baulk changing procedures were modified
* a safety chain is placed around the latching mechanism preventing it opening until the baulks are located in the slot, when the chain is removed, and
* baulk changes are undertaken when there is no wind.
Nil (near miss)Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2013Raw waterShannondale, NSW, AustraliaOperational issueSelective offtake at different depths in a dam is achieved with the use of removable baulks. The baulks are raised and lowered into position using a crane, and there is a mechanism which unlatches the crane hook from the baulk when it encounters sufficent force (i.e. when it is stopped by the baulk underneath). The baulks are lowered through a slot in the dam offtake tower. The operator was changing baulks when the baulk being lowered missed the slot and hit the deck of the offtake tower with sufficient force to unlatch the hook. The baulk then fell sideways. Baulk changing procedures were modified
* A safety chain is placed around the latching mechanism preventing it opening until the baulks are located in the slot, when the chain is removed, and
* Baulk changes are undertaken when there is no wind.
Nil (near hit)Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2012Drinking waterMaclean, NSW, AustraliaE. coli found leading to a Boil Water AlertMaclean is a town of around 2600 people located on the Clarence River, approximately 25km upstream of Yamba. Due to the distance from the chloramination point the town historically had very low chlorine residuals. Following an E. coli detection during routine sampling, around 200 residents in a very defined area of the top part of Maclean fed by the “Lookout Reservoir” were advised to boil water from 21st December 2012 until 7th January 2013. In response to e.coli detection Council added liquid chlorine to the reservoir, flushed the system, inspected and cleaned the reservoir. After these actions there were still no obvious signs of the contamination source. During the event despite the reservoir chlorine dosing there was only a very small residual detected in the reticulation, although there was good residual in the reservoir. This was initially thought to be due to a contaminant in the reticulation creating chlorine demand; however, it was subsequently determined that as the reservoir was filled by pumping through the reticulation the low residual in the reticulation was due to the low residual at the pumping station. The reservoir was also bottom fed. Since this event permanent supplementary chlorine dosing was installed in Maclean (before the pump station) and the reservoir also changed to a top fill. The timing of this E. coli detection just before a holiday period made management of the incident difficult as many suppliers were closed; this incident also demonstrated the important of having adequate supplies on hand in case an incident occurs over a holiday period.
Moderator Note: Timeline was end 2012 into beginning 2013.
200 customers on a boil water alert for 18 days.Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2012Drinking waterGlenreagh, NSW, AustraliaE. coli found leading to a Boil Water AlertGlenreagh is a village of around 400 people located on the Orara River approximately 45km south of Grafton. Following an E. coli detection during routine sampling, Glenreagh residents were advised to boil water from 7th December 2012 until 12th December 2012. In response to e.coli detection Council added liquid chlorine added to the reservoir, flushed the system, and inspected the reservoirs. The chlorinator was also investigated and it was found to have failed due to a problem with the inlet valve. Since this event, the inlet valve at Glenreagh now has regular maintenance and on-line telemetry monitoring of the chlorinator has been introduced.400 customers on boil water alert for 5 daysGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2011Drinking waterCopmanhurst, NSW, AustraliaE. coli found leading to a Boil Water AlertCopmanhurst is a village of around 250 people located on the Clarence River approximately 40km upstream of Grafton. Due to the distance from the chloramination point the village historically had very low chlorine residuals. Following an E. coli detection during routine sampling, Copmanhurst residents were advised to boil water from 5th May 2011 until 19th May 2011. In response to e.coli detection Council added liquid chlorine to the reservoir, flushed the system, inspected and cleaned the reservoir. Upon cleaning the reservoir a snake was located and was the suspected cause of contamination. While snakes are cold blooded, it is thought that E. coli may have been introduced from a warm blooded animal which the snake had eaten. Since this event, the reservoir at Copmanhurst is now offline, with the village pressure coming from an alternate larger reservoir approximately 20km from Copmanhurst. Additionally, there is now a supplementary chlorine dosing point on the line out to Copmanhurst. 250 customers on boil water alert for 14 daysGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2011Drinking waterGrafton, NSW, AustraliaChlorineAn operator transporting 90kg chlorine gas cylinders in the rear of a utility (less than the quanitity for which a Dangerous Goods motor licence is required) swerved to avoid a kangaroo and rolled the vehicle several times. As the vehicle was carrying chlorine cylinders this was classified by attending emergency services as a Hazmat incident. Toolbox talks were given to staff regarding not swerving to avoid wildlife.Operator was off work for 3 months recovering from injuries sustained in motor vehicle accident; motor vehicle written off; Supplier advised chlorine cylinders sustained no damageGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2011SewageMaclean, NSW, AustraliaSewageThe end weir penstock decant in an STP treatment tank consists of two aluminium gates with a centrally mounted actuator which drives through a distribution gearbox to four bevel gearboxes. These gearboxes drive bronze nuts that move threaded stems located at each end of the gates up and down. The gearbox mechanism on one of the threaded stems failed with the gate in the lowered position. When the weir began to raise, the overtorque mechanism did not operate and only one side of the gate was raised, which significantly distorted the gate. Subsequent investigation determined:
* the supplier training incorrectly advised that the gearbox did not need to be greased, which was considered a primary cause of premature gearbox failure.
* The manual indicated the drive mechanism should be checked for wear but did not indicate what was unacceptable wear.
* The overtorque relay did not operate because the trip circuit terminals had been bridged (apparently when installed) and this bridge had not been removed.
One treatment tank out of service for 8 weeks while repairs to decant mechanism undertakenGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2011SewageMaclean, NSW, AustraliaSewageStaff attended a pump blockage of the duty pump at a sewage pump station just before normal finishing time and determined that the blockage could be cleared the following day as a crane was required to lift the pump. They turned the duty pump to "off" on the assumption that the electronic controller would then automatically use the standby pump. However the controller program did not automatically start the standby pump. While a high level alarm was generated, a thunderstorm the previous evening had damaged the main telemetry dialler, although this was not known at the time. The backup telemetry dialler was being relocated to a new building at the STP the following morning and had been disconnected from the telephone that day. The manufacturer of the pump controller was advised of the incident so they could modify their standard program.Up to 200kL raw sewage environmental overflowGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2011Drinking waterGrafton, NSW, AustraliaChlorineAn operator transporting 90 kg chlorine gas cylinders in the rear of a utility (less than the quanitity for which a Dangerous Goods motor licence is required) swerved to avoid a kangaroo and rolled the vehicle several times. As the vehicle was carrying chlorine cylinders this was classified by attending emergency services as a Hazmat incident. Toolbox talks were given to staff regarding not swerving to avoid wildlife.Operator was off work for 3 months recovering from injuries sustained in motor vehicle accident; motor vehicle written off; Supplier advised chlorine cylinders sustained no damageGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2011SewageMaclean NSW, AustraliaSewageThe end weir penstock decant in an STP treatment tank consists of two aluminium gates with a centrally mounted actuator which drives through a distribution gearbox to four bevel gearboxes. These gearboxes drive bronze nuts that move threaded stems located at each end of the gates up and down. The gearbox mechanism on one of the threaded stems failed with the gate in the lowered position. When the weir began to raise, the overtorque mechanism did not operate and only one side of the gate was raised, which significantly distorted the gate. Subsequent investigation determined:
* The supplier training incorrectly advised that the gearbox did not need to be greased, which was considered a primary cause of premature gearbox failure.
* The manual indicated the drive mechanism should be checked for wear but did not indicate what was unacceptable wear.
* The overtorque relay did not operate because the trip circuit terminals had been bridged (apparently when installed) and this bridge had not been removed.
One treatment tank out of service for 8 weeks while repairs to decant mechanism undertakenGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2011SewageMaclean NSW, AustraliaSewageStaff attended a pump blockage of the duty pump at a sewage pump station just before normal finishing time and determined that the blockage could be cleared the following day as a crane was required to lift the pump. They turned the duty pump to "off" on the assumption that the electronic controller would then automatically use the standby pump. However the controller program did not automatically start the standby pump. While a high level alarm was generated, a thunderstorm the previous evening had damaged the main telemetry dialler, although this was not known at the time. The backup telemetry dialler was being relocated to a new building at the STP the following morning and had been disconnected from the telephone that day. The manufacturer of the pump controller was advised of the incident so they could modify their standard program.Up to 200 kL raw sewage environmental overflowGreg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2010Drinking waterSaratoga Springs, Utah, USACampylobacterThe City of Saratoga Springs, Utah, issued a boil water order for the northern half of the city this week (15 May 2010) after Campylobacter bacteria were discovered in the city's culinary water system.
Posted 17/05/10
Information shared by Nahim Nehme, Griffith City Council, NSW, Australia
Thirteen subdivisions affected and told to boil water or drink bottled waterFood Safety News Link
2010Drinking waterLongreach, QLD, AustraliaE. coliRegular monitoring of the Longreach Water Supply has detected minute traces of E. coli in the Longreach’s Water Supply (January 2010). As a precaution, Council is advising town residents to use cooled, boiled water for drinking, cooking, washing raw foods, making ice and cleaning teeth. Apparently a 'mechanical fault' at the treatment plant was thought to be responsible for the detection of E. coli although the nature of the fault was not elaborated.

Posted 17/05/10
Information shared by Nahim Nehme, Griffith City Council, NSW, Australia
Residents had to boil waterLong Reach Website Link
2010Drinking waterNerang, Gold Coast, QLD, AustraliaE. coliE. coli was detected during routine testing. Residents were required to boil their water. No cause of the event was known at the time of posting.
http://www.couriermail.com.au/news/queensland/e-coli-detected-in-gold-coast-drinking-water/story-e6freoof-1225843134479
http://www.goldcoast.qld.gov.au/newsweb/t_news_item.aspx?pid=8798
Posted 26/03/10
2500 homes affected with a boil water alertCourier Mail Link
2010Drinking waterBowen, QLD, AustraliaE. coliWhitsunday Regional Council issued a boil water notice after recent tests on the Bowen water system found Escherichia coli in the treated water.
Recent rainfall was thought to have contributed to the presence of the bacteria in the water supply.
(Posted 26/03/10
Information shared by Nahim Nehme, Griffith City Council, NSW)

Bowen residents were required to boil their water for more than a weekDail Mercury Link
2010General operationsMaclean, NSW, AustraliaOperational issueAn operator was loading a roll of 100mm poly pipe onto the tray of a truck using a hiab crane. Due to the diameter of the roll the pipe had to be stood up in the truck as it was too wide to lay flat. Before the roll could be secured, it shifted and knocked the operator off the truck. The operator fell to the ground, landing on his head, and the roll of pipe landed on him. Following this incident:
* Procedures were modified to remind staff that consideration needs to be given to release of stored energy in situations where the load may be coiled, strapped, fastened, etc, and in particular consideration of whether additional strapping is required and how best to release strapping
* Pipe is delivered direct to the job site where possible,
* Where staff are transporting pipe, a caged trailer is used rather than standing the pipe roll up in the the back of the truck.

This was a Workcover reportable incident.
Operator was hospitalised for several weeks and did not return to full duties for 2 years.Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2010Drinking waterWooli, NSW, AustraliaChlorineA village operator (who was not trained in chlorine plant operation) attended a chlorination plant following a power outage to check the system was working and heard the chlorine alarm sounding. He decided to open the door and was met with chlorine. He shut the door and called approrpiately qualified staff to address the chlorine leak. As a result of this incident:
* extraction fans and strobe warning lights were installed on all chlorination sheds
* signs have been placed on all chlroination sheds "Do not enter whilst light is flashing"
* gas sensors have been connected to force the extractor fans and strobe light and also generate a telemetry alarms
* Procedures updated and toolbox talks given regarding chlorine safety and that only appropriately trained staff are to open the door if the chlorine alarm is sounding.

This was a Workcover reportable incident.
Operator off work for 1 day; however the investigating Workcover inspector advised they considered this incident as a "near fatality".Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2010General operationsMaclean NSW, AustraliaOperational issueAn operator was loading a roll of 100mm poly pipe onto the tray of a truck using a hiab crane. Due to the diameter of the roll the pipe had to be stood up in the truck as it was too wide to lay flat. Before the roll could be secured, it shifted and knocked the operator off the truck. The operator fell to the ground, landing on his head, and the roll of pipe landed on him. Following this incident:
* Procedures were modified to remind staff that consideration needs to be given to release of stored energy in situations where the load may be coiled, strapped, fastened, etc, and in particular consideration of whether additional strapping is required and how best to release strapping
* Pipe is delivered direct to the job site where possible,
* Where staff are transporting pipe, a caged trailer is used rather than standing the pipe roll up in the the back of the truck.

This was a Workcover reportable incident.
Operator was hospitalised for several weeks and did not return to full duties for 2 years.Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2010Drinking waterWooli, NSW, AustraliaChlorineA village operator (who was not trained in chlorine plant operation) attended a chlorination plant following a power outage to check the system was working and heard the chlorine alarm sounding. He decided to open the door and was met with chlorine. He shut the door and called appropriately qualified staff to address the chlorine leak. As a result of this incident:
* Extraction fans and strobe warning lights were installed on all chlorination sheds
* Signs have been placed on all chlorination sheds "Do not enter whilst light is flashing"
* Gas sensors have been connected to force the extractor fans and strobe light and also generate a telemetry alarms
* Procedures updated and toolbox talks given regarding chlorine safety and that only appropriately trained staff are to open the door if the chlorine alarm is sounding.

This was a Workcover reportable incident.
Operator off work for 1 day; however the investigating Workcover inspector advised they considered this incident as a "near fatality".Greg Mashiah, Manager Water Cycle, Clarence Valley Council pers. communication. February 2016.
2009Drinking waterJindabyne, NSW, AustraliaSewageA mega litre of raw sewage flowed into Lake Jindabyne, the source of the town's water supply. Snowy River Shire Council confirmed a leak at a sewer pump station located behind the Jindabyne Bowling Club and estimated between 0.5 and 0.8 mega litres of sewage spilled into the lake over a three-day period.
(Posted 01/09/09)
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/08/27/2668269.htm?site=news
http://www.news.com.au/couriermail/story/0,23739,25936818-953,00.html


Tourists and residents had to boil water or drink bottled water for around two weeksArea Health Service Link
2009Drinking waterSmiggins Holes, NSW, AustraliaUnknownA malfunction of the water supply system (operated by the National Parks and Wildlife Service) caused the tank to run out of water. Some sort of bacteria or virus, picked up from the bottom of the tank, was thought to have been flushed down the lines and to taps. Results of testing on earlier water samples proved inconclusive but given the number of people who fell sick and the timing of the gastric outbreak it was thought that the incident is most likely linked to contamination of the water supply.

(http://www.environment.nsw.gov.au/media/DecMedia09081902.htm
Posted 01/09/09)
Close to 120 guests were struck down with gastric illnessSummit Sun Link
2009Drinking waterBrisbane, Queensland, AustraliaFluoride overdoseUp to three safeguard systems failed at the North Pine water-treatment plant allowing drinking water to be released to residents with fluoride levels that were originally thought to be 20 times the legal limit (30 milligrams of fluoride per litre, rather than the 1.5mg/litre maximum) for a duration of three hours on May 2. A follow-up investigation found that levels were actually 19.4 mg/L and only a small number of people had been affected compared to those previously thought to have been exposed.
(http://www.cabinet.qld.gov.au/MMS/StatementDisplaySingle.aspx?id=64025
http://www.nrw.qld.gov.au/compliance/wic/pdf/fluoride_pascoe.pdf
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/story/0,,25490663-23289,00.html
Posted 20/06/09 and 01/09/09)
Originally thought to have affected 4,000 properties affected but refined to 211 children at a YMCA camp and four housesHealthstream Link
2009Drinking waterLithgow, NSW, AustraliaConcern over heavy metals, particularly nickel General Practitioners stated that Lithgow has high levels of chronic illnesses such as diabetes and heart disease and these doctors wanted to know if there were any links to water which is pumped into the city's water supply from the Clarence Colliery. Water quality testing results (mandatorily carried out for the NSW Drinking Water Quality Monitoring Program) showed that Lithgow's water supply routinely meets the Australian Drinking Water Guidelines for a range of parameters including nickel.
(http://www.council.lithgow.com/media/090717_concernsAllayed.html
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/07/15/2626077.htm)
None - perception-based issue proven to be unfounded based on water quality testing resultsABC Link
2008Drinking waterAlamosa, Colorado, US Salmonella, Giardia & Cryptosporidium were all found in the town's water supply The town, of about 8,500 residents, gets its water from a deep well system. Water sourced from the aquifer is not chlorinated. A disease outbreak of salmonellosis occurred in the town. The contamination of the water supply was still unknown at the time of writing.400 cases of illness and up to 16 people being hospitalisedCBS Link
2008Drinking waterAffecting 42 of Zimbabwe's 62 districts including the capital, HarareVibrio choleraeContamination of the Limpopo River with contaminated river water also passing the border into South Africa and causing cholera cases in South Africa's Limpopo province. Unclear of the cause of the outbreak but the Limpopo River supplies many dams used for drinking water supply and the town of Beitbridge is supplied by the river directly.
(See also the following for water resource information www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5744e/y5744e07.htm.)
565 deaths and 12,546 illness at the time of posting (22/01/09)Relief Web Link
2008Drinking waterNorthampton Town, Daventry, South Northamptonshire and areas in Wellingborough, East Midlands, UKCryptosporidiumAn estimated 250,000 individuals were put at risk by the exceedance in cryptosporidial oocysts found in the water supply leaving Pitsford Reservoir during the period 19 to 24 June 2008. The source of the contamination was identified as a small rabbit that had gained access to the treatment process. Further testing of the water samples taken from the distribution system, and also from the rabbit, carried out by the Cryptosporidium Reference Laboratory in Swansea, confirmed that they were of the same strain, identified as a rabbit genotype. This case is significant as it appears to be the first where a Cryptosporidium species from a rabbit has been found to infect humans.
See also www.northantset.co.uk/news/Rabbit-caused-water-contamination-at.4286344.jp
250,000 individuals were put at risk, 29 cases of cryptosporidiosis at the time of posting UK National Archives Link
2007Drinking waterLilla Edet, SwedenNorovirusA large outbreak of norovirus gastroenteritis was caused by contaminated municipal drinking water, in Lilla Edet, Sweden. Costs associated with the outbreak were collected via a questionnaire survey given to organizations and municipalities involved in or affected by the outbreak. Total costs including sick leave, were estimated to be ∼8 700 000 Swedish kronor (∼€0·87 million) (Larsson et al 2014). About 2400 (18·5%) of the 13 000 inhabitants in Lilla Edet became ill.LARSSON, C., ANDERSSON, Y., ALLESTAM, G., LINDQVIST, A., NENONEN, N. and O. BERGSTEDT (2014) Epidemiology and estimated costs of a large waterborne outbreak of norovirus infection in Sweden. Epidemiology and Infection Volume 142(3): 592-600
2007Drinking waterGalway, IrelandCryptosporidiumHistorically high precipitation levels and the lake reaching the highest level on record were linked to exceedances above the guideline level of less than 1 oocyst/10 litres in the finished water. 182Pelly H, Cormican M, O'Donovan D, Chalmers R, Hanahoe B, Cloughley R, et al. A large outbreak of cryptosporidiosis in western Ireland linked to public water supply: a preliminary report. Euro Surveill 2007;12(5):E070503.3.
2007Drinking waterRøros, NorwayCampylobacter The municipal waterworks, which supplies Røros town, provides 3600 people with tap water. Groundwater comes into the system from two wells drilled into an aquifer under an island in a lake northeast of Røros. The water is not chlorinated or disinfected before reaching consumers. While tapwater was identified as the most probably source of the infection, Campylobacter was not found in the town's water. However, several events that might have caused pressure fall and influx of contaminated water into the water distribution system were noted. On two occasions, pressure fall was noticed and because parts of the distribution system were outdated, it is likely that the pressure fall caused ingress of contamination leading to the outbreak.105 cases confirmedIrena Jakopanec, Katrine Borgen, Line Vold, Helge Lund, Tore Forseth, Raisa Hannula and Karin Nygård (2008) A large waterborne outbreak of campylobacteriosis in Norway: The need to focus on distribution system safety. BMC Infectious Diseases 2008, 8:128.
2007RainwaterEsperance, WA, AustraliaLeadThe Esperance Port Authority exported lead carbonate. This material was mined at the Magellan mine near Wiluna some 900 km north of Esperance by Magellan Metals Pty Ltd and railed to Esperance. The Esperance Port Authority handled this material in bulk, and there were lead emissions from the Port and contamination of the town site and adjacent environs. The extent of those emissions and any contamination of the town site are matters that are currently the subject of prosecution by the DEC.
(Posted 01/09/09)
Many rainwater tanks had levels of lead and nickel exceeding the maximum levels specified in the 2004 Australian Drinking Water Guidelines. Blood lead levels in the population were also found to be elevated.WA Public Health Link
2006SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaBiosolidsUtility staff were using a 240V portable pump to empty a sewage sludge lagoon into a Geotube when they were called away to attend a reticulation blockage. The blockage was not cleared until after dark, and the staff inadvertently left the pump turned on when they left the STP. This eventually resulted in failure of the Geotube and considerable biosolids spillage around the STP. As a result of this incident a timer was purchased to use on the power outlet.
Moderator Note: Timeline approximate.
Cleanup of spilled biosolids requiredMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2006SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaSewageA raw sewage overflow occurred from a pump station without an alarm being generated. The pump station has a low level float switch to operate the duty pump and a high level float switch which operates the standby pump and also generates a telemetry alarm. The high level float switch was wired as "normally open" and it was determined that there was a break in the cable; thus the pump control remained "open circuit" and could not start the standby pump or generate an alarm. Subsequent investigation of the utility's sewerage network indicated about 20% of sensors were wired as "open circuit". These have been changed to closed circuit so if the cable breaks it will also send an alarm - this is "safe fail" in that if the cable fails it will send an alarm, and the specification for future work requires sensors to be wired as closed circuit.
Moderator Note: Timeline approximate.
Raw sewage environmental overflowMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2006Bottled waterPort Kent, NY, USDiatoms and total coliform bacteriaNorth Country Spring Water, Ltd bottled water was found to be contaminated. May have been caused by a potential surface water contamination event at the water source and/or a temporary breakdown in the company's filtration systemNone confirmedFDA Link
2006SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaBiosolidsUtility staff were using a 240V portable pump to empty a sewage sludge lagoon into a Geotube when they were called away to attend a reticulation blockage. The blockage was not cleared until after dark, and the staff inadvertently left the pump turned on when they left the STP. This eventually resulted in failure of the Geotube and considerable biosolids spillage around the STP. As a result of this incident a timer was purchased to use on the power outlet.
Moderator Note: Timeline approximate.
Cleanup of spilled biosolids required.Mashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2006SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaSewageA raw sewage overflow occurred from a pump station without an alarm being generated. The pump station has a low level float switch to operate the duty pump and a high level float switch which operates the standby pump and also generates a telemetry alarm. The high level float switch was wired as "normally open" and it was determined that there was a break in the cable; thus the pump control remained "open circuit" and could not start the standby pump or generate an alarm. Subsequent investigation of the utility's sewerage network indicated about 20% of sensors were wired as "open circuit". These have been changed to closed circuit so if the cable breaks it will also send an alarm - this is "safe fail" in that if the cable fails it will send an alarm, and the specification for future work requires sensors to be wired as closed circuit.
Moderator Note: Timeline approximate.
Raw sewage environmental overflowMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2005SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaN/AThe flocculant storage volume at the then only STP with artificial flocculation was such that, for a full truckload delivery there was only about 7 days supply remaining. The utility had a period supply contract which permitted use of other suppliers if the preferred supplier was unable to provide service. On one occasion the supplier did not arrive on the nominated day. When contacted, they apologised and indicated that they would deliver in four days, when the utility would have about three days flocculant supply remaining. Again, they failed to arrive and when contacted they advised that they would be at least another seven days. While the utility immediately arranged for an alternative supplier, delivery took several days with the result that the utility was unable to dose flocculant at the desired level.

While the utility has now commissioned other STPs using the same flocculant, and if a similar situation occurred it would be possible to transfer flocculant from another STPs, during floods the various STPs are isolated for up to a week. As part of the procedures when the BOM issues a flood watch, the volume of all chemicals required at STPs is checked and supply ordered if necessary. Fortunately a flood watch generally gives four or five days notice.
Moderator Note: Timeline approximate.
Lower level of sewage treatment for four days with impact on effluent suspended solids and phosphorusMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2005SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaN/AThe flocculant storage volume at the then only STP with artificial flocculation was such that, for a full truckload delivery there was only about 7 days supply remaining. The utility had a period supply contract which permitted use of other suppliers if the preferred supplier was unable to provide service. On one occasion the supplier did not arrive on the nominated day. When contacted, they apologised and indicated that they would deliver in four days, when the utility would have about three days flocculant supply remaining. Again, they failed to arrive and when contacted they advised that they would be at least another seven days. While the utility immediately arranged for an alternative supplier, delivery took several days with the result that the utility was unable to dose flocculant at the desired level.

While the utility has now commissioned other STPs using the same flocculant, and if a similar situation occurred it would be possible to transfer flocculant from another STPs, during floods the various STPs are isolated for up to a week. As part of the procedures when the BOM issues a flood watch, the volume of all chemicals required at STPs is checked and supply ordered if necessary. Fortunately a flood watch generally gives four or five days notice.
Moderator Note: Timeline approximate.
Lower level of sewage treatment for four days with impact on effluent suspended solids and PhosphorusMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2005RainwaterAged care facility, Queensland, AustraliaMultiple serotypes of Salmonella, including Muenchen, Chester, and Subspecies 3bSalmonellosis outbreak at an aged care facility thought to be caused by a contaminated rainwater tank. Salmonella Subspecies 3b was isolated from water from the facility’s rainwater tank. The tank water was also heavily contaminated with E. coli. The source was thought to be amphibians or reptiles.8OzFoodNet (2005) © Enhancing foodborne disease surveillance across Australia: Quarterly report, January to March 2005: Communicable Diseases Intelligence 29:197-8
2005SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaN/AThe flocculant storage volume at the then only STP with artificial flocculation was such that, for a full truckload delivery there was only about 7 days supply remaining. The utility had a period supply contract which permitted use of other suppliers if the preferred supplier was unable to provide service. On one occasion the supplier did not arrive on the nominated day. When contacted, they apologised and indicated that they would deliver in four days, when the utility would have about three days flocculant supply remaining. Again, they failed to arrive and when contacted they advised that they would be at least another seven days. While the utility immediately arranged for an alternative supplier, delivery took several days with the result that the utility was unable to dose flocculant at the desired level.

While the utility has now commissioned other STPs using the same flocculant, and if a similar situation occurred it would be possible to transfer flocculant from another STPs, during floods the various STPs are isolated for up to a week. As part of the procedures when the BOM issues a flood watch, the volume of all chemicals required at STPs is checked and supply ordered if necessary. Fortunately a flood watch generally gives four or five days notice.
Moderator Note: Timeline approximate.
Lower level of sewage treatment for four days with impact on effluent suspended solids and phosphorusMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2004SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaN/AThe decant trough on the then single activated sludge tank at the Yamba Sewage Treatment Plant (STP), which was installed in 1999, has a centrally mounted motor on a bridge over the tank and the trough is raised and lowered with two steel ropes connected at either end of the trough. The maintenance manual for the STP did not indicate that any maintenance or checking of the steel ropes was required and, as this was the first mechanism of this type used by the utility, it was was unaware that the steel ropes should be changed after a period of service. Given the STP is located about 500 metres from the ocean, the steel ropes are subject to attack from both chlorides and sulphides. On the Thursday before Easter one steel rope snapped, dropping one end of the trough into the activated sludge tank. Limit switches controlling the raising and lowering of the trough had been installed only on the end which had dropped into the tank. When the decant cycle started, the side which still had a rope was raised until it hit the bridge. The motor had been installed with mounting bolt holes larger than the Australian Standard, and it appears the strain caused the motor to move as it pulled a coupling with an overload sensor apart and thus the motor did not stop until it burned out. When staff attended the STP the steel rope was under significant tension, so access to the bridge was prohibited due to the risk of failure until a fitter could attend and release the strain. The largest daily inflow to the plant generally occurs over Easter; thus the utility had a very limited opportunity to put in.temporary decant measures. As a result of this incident:
* a limit switch was installed on the other side of the bridge,
* a new maintenance schedule was introduced which changed the steel ropes annually,
* all subsequent STPs have been constructed with two treatment tanks so sewage treatment can still occur if there is equipment failure in one tank.

Following the incident, discussion with other utilities with similar decant mechanisms indicated that they had experienced identical failures, but had not shared this information with other utilities. Despite advising the designer of the issue and recommending that they advise other clients with similar mechanisms that the maintenance manual needed to be updated to include changing wire ropes, it is understood that no such information was circulated.
* Bypass of STP (screening of raw sewage only) for approximately 12 hours
* Manually operated pumping used for decanting during Easter period (permanent repairs unable to commence until Tuesday due to Easter break)
Mashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2004SewageYamba, NSW, AustraliaN/AThe decant trough on the then single activated sludge tank at the Yamba Sewage Treatment Plant (STP), which was installed in 1999, has a centrally mounted motor on a bridge over the tank and the trough is raised and lowered with two steel ropes connected at either end of the trough. The maintenance manual for the STP did not indicate that any maintenance or checking of the steel ropes was required and, as this was the first mechanism of this type used by the utility, it was unaware that the steel ropes should be changed after a period of service. Given the STP is located about 500 metres from the ocean, the steel ropes are subject to attack from both chlorides and sulphides. On the Thursday before Easter one steel rope snapped, dropping one end of the trough into the activated sludge tank. Limit switches controlling the raising and lowering of the trough had been installed only on the end which had dropped into the tank. When the decant cycle started, the side which still had a rope was raised until it hit the bridge. The motor had been installed with mounting bolt holes larger than the Australian Standard, and it appears the strain caused the motor to move as it pulled a coupling with an overload sensor apart and thus the motor did not stop until it burned out. When staff attended the STP the steel rope was under significant tension, so access to the bridge was prohibited due to the risk of failure until a fitter could attend and release the strain. The largest daily inflow to the plant generally occurs over Easter; thus the utility had a very limited opportunity to put in temporary decant measures. As a result of this incident:
* A limit switch was installed on the other side of the bridge,
* A new maintenance schedule was introduced which changed the steel ropes annually,
* All subsequent STPs have been constructed with two treatment tanks so sewage treatment can still occur if there is equipment failure in one tank.

Following the incident, discussion with other utilities with similar decant mechanisms indicated that they had experienced identical failures, but had not shared this information with other utilities. Despite advising the designer of the issue and recommending that they advise other clients with similar mechanisms that the maintenance manual needed to be updated to include changing wire ropes, it is understood that no such information was circulated.
* Bypass of STP (screening of raw sewage only) for approximately 12 hours
* Manually operated pumping used for decanting during Easter period (permanent repairs unable to commence until Tuesday due to Easter break)
Mashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2003Drinking waterYamba, NSW, AustraliaSewageA developer construction contractor tapped subdivision fire hydrants onto a PVC sewer rising main, which was only detected when the hydrants were tested and there was no flow, followed by what was obviously pumped flow (the water reticulation is supplied by gravity). It is understood that the contractor was using inexperienced staff with inadequate supvervision. NilMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2003Drinking waterYamba, NSW, AustraliaSewageA developer construction contractor tapped subdivision fire hydrants onto a PVC sewer rising main, which was only detected when the hydrants were tested and there was no flow, followed by what was obviously pumped flow (the water reticulation is supplied by gravity). It is understood that the contractor was using inexperienced staff with inadequate supvervision. NilMashiah, G. (2009) Here we go again? Sharing experiences of Incidents in the NSW Water Industry. NSW AWA Regional Conference, Port Macquarie
2002Drinking waterMaricopa County, Arizona, USANaegleria fowleri In 2002, two five-year olds living in Maricopa County, Arizona became infected with Naegleria fowleri and subsequently died of Primary Amoebic Meningitis (PAM), 72 hours after hospital admission. The water supply provided to the children’s homes was sourced from an untreated groundwater supply and provided by a private water company. N. fowleri was subsequently isolated from the groundwater supplied to one of the children’s homes and from the refrigerator filter from the second child’s grandparents’ home (at which the child spent a lot of time). The pathogen was also found in bathroom and kitchen pipes as well as filtered bathwater from both homes.2 deathsReynolds, K.A. (2006) Newly Identified Tap Water Sources of Pathogenic Amoeba. Water Conditioning & Purification. January 2006. 58-60.
2001Drinking waterDracy Le Fort, Burgundy, FranceCryptosporidium hominis (found in 19 of the patients)Not stated but tapwater was found to be the only common risk factor563Dalle F, Roz P, Dautin G, Di Palma M, Kohli E, Sire-Bidault C, et al. Molecular characterization of isolates of waterborne Cryptosporidium spp. collected during an outbreak of gastroenteritis in South Burgundy, France. J Clin Microbiol 2003; 41:2690-3.
2000Drinking waterClitheroe, Lancs, UKCryptosporidiumLocal investigations showed that a spring which feeds a local reservoir is in an animal grazing area. The Cryptosporidium was typed as originating from an animal source. 45UK National Archives Link
2000Drinking waterWalkerton, Ontario, CanadaPrimarily E. coli O157:H7 & Campylobacter jejuniPoor chlorination plant performance, storm in catchment, poor operating practices7 deaths (including a 2 year old child) and 2,300 illnessesO’Connor, D.R. (2002) Report of the Walkerton Inquiry: The Events of May 2000 and Related Issues. Part One: A Summary. Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General. ISBN: 0-7794-2558-8
2000Drinking waterEngland and WalesCryptosporidiumHeavy rainfall and flood alerts preceded cases of cryptosporidiosis. Oocysts were thought to infiltrate the reservoir from springs. The oocyst persisted in the distribution system after the water supplier had chosen a different water source. Persistence of oocysts may have been due to entrapment of the oocysts in the biofilm.58Howe AD, Forster S, Morton S, Marshall R, Osborn KS, Wright P, Hunter PR. Cryptosporidium oocysts in a water supply associated with a cryptosporidiosis outbreak. Emerg Infect Dis 2002;8(6):619-24.
2000Drinking waterNorthern IrelandCryptosporidiumSeepage into the distribution system from human sewage from a septic tank and wastewater from a blocked drain were found to be responsible for waterborne cryptosporidiosis cases between 2000 and 2001. 347 laboratory confirmed casesGlaberman S, Moore JE, Lowery CJ, Chalmers RM, Sulaiman I, Elwin K, et al. Three drinking-water-associated cryptosporidiosis outbreaks, Northern Ireland. Emerg Infect Dis 2002;8(6):631-3.
1999Drinking waterWashington County Fair, NY State, US E. coli O157:H7 (positive confirmation in the septic tank) & Campylobacter jejuni Attendants at a county fair drank beverages made with water accessed from the groundwater system (Well 6). A septic system associated with a dormitory on the fairground site was suspected of contaminating the well – particularly given that E. coli O157:H7 was also found in the septic system and hydraulic connectivity was established between the well and the septic system.2 deaths and 71 people hospitalised of which 14 people developed haemolytic uraemic syndromeCDC (1999) Outbreak of Escherichia coli O157:H7 and Campylobacter among attendees of the Washington County Fair – New York 1999. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report 48(36), 803-804.
1998Drinking waterSydney, NSW, AustraliaCryptosporidium & GiardiaStorm in catchment and supposed breakthrough of filtration plantHazards found in the water supply but no disease incidence noted in the communityAnon (1998) Protozoa in Sydney. Healthstream. Issue 11. September 1998
Byleveld, P.M., Hunt, A. and Jeremy M McAnulty, J.M. (1999) Cryptosporidiosis in the immunocompromised: weighing up the risk. Medical Journal of Australia. 171: 426-428
1998Drinking waterOulu, FinlandCampylobacter jejuniMains repair work causing a cross contamination of the unchlorinated groundwater supply with sewageApprox. 3000 (one fifth of the town)Kuusi M., Nuorti J.P., Hanninen M.L., Koskela M., Jusilla V., Kela E., Miettinen I. and Ruutu P. (2005) A large outbreak of campylobacteriosis associated with a municipal water supply in Finland. Epidemiol Infect 133:593-601.
1995Drinking waterNorthern ItalyCryptosporidiumOocysts were identified in sediment of a drinking water tank belonging to a drug rehabilitation community. Not specifically stated although the attack rate was 13.6% in HIV-negative individuals and 30.7% in HIV-positive individuals - the latter varying with CD4 cell count.Pozio E, Rezza G, Boschini A, Pezzotti P, Tamburrini A, Rossi P, et al. Clinical cryptosporidiosis and human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)-induced immunosuppression: findings from a longitudinal study of HIV-positive and HIV-negative former injection drug users. J Infect Dis 1997;176(4):969-75.
1993Drinking waterMilwaukee, WI, USACryptosporidiumPoor water filtration plant performance and storm in catchment washing in human sewageEstimated 100 deaths and 403,000 illnessMac Kenzie W.R., Hoxie N.J., Proctor M.E., Gradus M.S., Blair K.A., Peterson D.E., Kazmierczak J.J., Addiss D.G., Fox K.R., Rose J.B., et al. (1994) A massive outbreak in Milwaukee of cryptosporidium infection transmitted through the public water supply. N Engl J Med. 331(3):161-7
1993Drinking waterNorthwest EnglandCryptosporidiumHeavy rainfall preceded a cryptosporidiosis outbreak. One water source was found to drain surface water directly from a field housing livestock, the natural sandstone barrier being bypassed. A case-control study showed significant correlation with drinking unboiled tapwater.47Bridgman SA, Robertson RMP, Syed Q, Speed N, Andrews N, and Hunter PR. Outbreak of cryptosporidiosis associated with a disinfected groundwater supply. Epidemiol Infect 1995;115(3):555-66.
1990Drinking waterBurdine Township, Missouri, USE. coli O157:H7 Shortly before the peak of the outbreak, 45 water meters were replaced, and two water mains ruptured. The water supply was unchlorinated.4 deaths and 243 illnessesSwerdlow DL, Woodruff BA, Brady RC, Griffin PM, Tippen S, Donnell HD Jr, Geldreich E, Payne BJ, Meyer A Jr, Wells JG, et al. (1992) A waterborne outbreak in Missouri of Escherichia coli O157:H7 associated with bloody diarrhea and death. Ann Intern Med. 1992 Nov 15;117(10):812-9
1988Drinking waterCamelford, UKAluminium sulphateAn inexperienced delivery contractor dumped 20 tonnes of concentrated aluminium sulphate solution into the wrong tank at the unmanned Lowermoor water treatment plant.Many people initially complained of taste issues in the water but no conclusive reports of illness were foundAnon (2005) Report On UK Aluminium Incident Health Stream Issue 37 March 2005.

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